Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 104
Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central to meaning and content.
>Truth conditions.
Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions instead perhaps verification theory.
>Deflationism.
Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verification conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without the that-sentences - i.e., without propositional content - then class of verification conditions instead of proposition.
>Verification conditions.
Inflationism: would say that these are no real propositions because these must include truth conditions. InflationismVsVerificationism.
II 126
Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism) - in particular, facts about the use of a language. FieldVs: what kind of facts are these supposed to be? - Deflationism: homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no more facts. ((s) homophony condition: "Snow is white" is true iff is snow is white).
>Homophony.
II 114
Deflationism: can assume facts.
>Facts, cf. >Nonfactualism.
Inflationist relation: "S has the truth conditions p".
II 126
Questions about the truth conditions: become questions about which language the person speaks.
>Language dependence.
Inflationism: would consider that as a question of use - (because he assumes facts).
II 220
Inflationism/FieldVsInflationism: increases the indeterminacy.
>Indeterminacy, >Translation.
II 230
Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: Inflationism needs a thing that is "neither bald nor non-bald".
Inflationism: explains example "weakly true" compositionally.
>Compositionality.
Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension".
>Supervaluation.
Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions".