Lexicon of Arguments

 

Wright I 278
Content/Contents/Wittgenstein: all substantive has softened. There are no relevant facts.
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Wittgenstein I 204
Content/Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the sentence "no object is red and green at the same time" is true for logical reasons but not for reasons of content.
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Brandom I 133
Content/Tractatus/Brandom: content needs not to be representational: e.g. logical vocabulary has content, but stands for nothing. Not every move in a language game represents something. >Representation, >Language game.
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Wittgenstein IV 20
Indoor/Outdoor/Tractatus: 3.13 The sentence includes everything that belongs to the projection, but not what is projected.
IV 21
So the possibility of the projected, not this itself.
The sentence does not yet contain its meaning, but the possibility of expressing it.
The sentence contains the form of its meaning, but not its content. >Form, >Meaning.
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VI 213
We all too easily conclude that sentences that are undoubtedly fixed are sentences whose content is known. >Sentences.
Example 1 + 1 = 2 can one really say that one "knows" the like? >Mathematics, >Knowledge.
Thesis: if doubts are excluded, the use of the term "knowledge" is inappropriate. >Doubts, >Moore's Hands, >Skepticism.
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VII 85
World/Subject/Status/Position/Power/Tetens: analogously: I cannot look over my own shoulder when looking at the world. I, as the subject of my perception, do not appear as part of the world I perceive. I as a subject am not content, not object of perception. >Perception, >Circular reasing.
VII 86
Subject/Tetens: I can never completely catch up with and objectify myself as a subject. I fall out of the content as a subject. >Subjects.
VII 91
Subject: shrinks to what has the thought - but not as part of the content of the thought.