Frege II 45
Intension/Extension: the thought is not the meaning (Fregean reference) of the sentence (but the content). For the terminology see also >
Fregean Sense.
((s) The terms 'intension' and 'extension' come from Carnap and were not used by Frege himself).
Sense/Frege: sense corresponds to the intension. >
Way of givenness.
Extension: the extension is the object. >
Object, >
Extension.
- - -
Dummett I 18
Def "sense" of an expression/Frege: is the way in which its reference is given.
Therefore we must first have the concept of the reference. But if we now have the concept of the reference before that of the sense, we cannot claim that the reference is a property of the sense, but only a property of the expression!
This becomes clear in the Basic Laws, where Frege determines the interpretation of his symbolism through determinations which prescribe each expression its respective reference. Taken together, these determinations determine for each formula under which conditions it is true. The sense is to be mentioned later. Accordingly, the determinations would be incomprehensible if the concept of the reference to an expression had been derived.
I 18
Frege then later explains the sense by referring to the determinations that regulate the reference. >
Fregean sense, >
Reference.
Dummett I 48
Reference/Frege: theory of reference was there before the theory of "sense". "Sense" determines the reference. Husserl: reference equals "sense":
The sense determines the relation (the "meaning") in the strong sense that it is - assuming the facts of the world - the factual sense of an expression that explains how it is given its factual "meaning" (relation). (Not only Evans' "weak" sense that no two expressions can have the same sense, but different "meanings" (reference).
Thus, a theory of reference is not yet a theory of sense, but its indispensable basis.
Not unlike Frege, Husserl takes the view that the sense of an expression is a constitutive element to which it owes its respective reference. >
Sense/Husserl.
Dummett I 48f
Use/Frege/Dummett: the use gives the meaning. The meaning gives the reference (Frege). Meaning is not equal to reference: e.g. unicorn: the term is not meaningless, therefore one knows only that it does not refer to any object.
I 48ff
Use/Frege/Dummett: use provides meaning - sense provides reference (Frege). Meaning is different from reference: e.g. unicorn.
>
Non-existence, >
Use, >
Unicorn example.
