Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 294
In sentences of the propositional setting I understand only each of the opaquely enclosed components as a designation of an intension. The individual parts are not designations of intensions.
I 379
Chisholm (according to Quine): intensional vocabulary (e.g. "important", "denote", "synonymous") is not easy to eliminate by other terms. - Gavagai: approval not by rabbits, but through belief in rabbits! (intensional) - QuineVsChisholm: is a stimuli, not a belief (stimuli are not intensional).
I 381
Brentano: intensional expressions are not reducible. (Quine pro)> indeterminacy.
One can understand Brentano's thesis in such a way, however, that it shows the insignificance of a science of intensions: to take the intensional use of language at face value means to postulate translation relations as objectively valid, although in principle they are indeterminate. But it does not work that way.
I 382
We do not give up everyday use but define our canonical notation:
Canonical notation: no citation except direct speech, no propositional attitudes except the physical constitution and physical behavior of organisms.
V 187
Problem: for the whole realm of intensions, attributes and sentence meanings, are not realized possible objects we need principles of individuation, which are completely missing in intensions. So we have to get rid of the intensions. See also >Individuation, >Possibilia.