Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Theses I
Theses II

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I 16
Def C-intension/Jackson: a c-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. ((s) This is where the semantics in possible world x causes the content c to be expressed, which is perhaps different from what can be meant by it in another possible world), i.e. it is relative to possible worlds.
>Possible worlds, >Cross world identity.
Def A-intension/Jackson: the A-intension is solely determined by the idea of propositino ((s) what is meant?) (regardless of possible worlds). Then there is a difference between modal and epistemic distinctions. There are no propositions that are both necessary and a posterori, and no propositions that are both contingent and a priori - but statements!
Def necessary a posteriori statement: a necessary a posteriori statement is one with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension.
>Necessity a posteriori.
Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is, on the other hand, one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension.
I 205
Def two-dimensional sentence intension/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional sentence intension is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value.
Def A-intensions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/Stalnaker: A intensions function with one argument and one centered world - their value is a truth value.
Def C-intension/secondary intension/secondary sentence intension/Stalnaker: C-intensions function with one argument and one possible world - their value is a truth value.
Cf. >Twodimensional semantics.
I 208
Two-dimensional intension/thought/non-rigid/content/Stalnaker: the two-dimensional intension for thoughts defines a non-rigid description of a proposition: the secondary intension is the reference of this description.
>Thoughts, >Rigidity.
Secondary proposition/Stalnaker: the secondary proposition is not the content of the thoughts of the speaker, but is determined by the content, as a function of the facts.
>Content/Stalnaker, >Facts.

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