Correction: (max 500 charact.)
The complaint will not be published.
Dennett I 599
Searle/Fodor: e.g. a freezing robot (Dennett): this robot does not have a correct intentionality, only an as-if intentionality. >
As-if intentionality .
Dennett: this is a distinction without reference.
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Fodor IV 14
Intentionality/holism/Fodor/Lepore: property T*: a belief only has this property when it expresses a proposition that the content of one or another belief is by me. E.g. if someone asks about a color, you will first think of red.
Problem: if we have biographically different thoughts, it may turn out that none of your thoughts has property T* in relation to my thoughts. Then only one of us could have thoughts about color and red.
Another problem: a change of opinion and of beliefs could not be explained. >
Colour .
VsIntentional Laws: Quine, Dennett, Davidson, Churchlands, Stich.
IV 127f
Belief is not a basic concept in the theory of intentionality. Instead: representations are a basic concept.
IV 130
Intentional attribution: an intentional assignment is not limited by rationality, because representations may also be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic. >
Attribution , >
Representation , >
Rationality , >
Deceptions .
Fodor/Lepore Vs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states. >
Irrationality .
Constitutive of belief: rationality: not at the same time that p and that not-p, but objects of intentional states may be contradictory. >
Objects , >
Thinking .