Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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III 49
Evolution/intentionality/Putnam: the evolution will give us no more intentionality than we have packed into it.
>Evolution.
III 51
Intentionality/Kant/Putnam: Kant's problem of intentionality is the question to what extent a content of consciousness can be an "idea", i.e. a "representation" of an object outside of consciousness is the most difficult riddle of philosophy.
>Consciousness/Kant, >Object/Kant, >Representation/Kant, >Thinking/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Representation, >Consciousness, >Imagination, >World/thinking.
III 203
Intentionality/reference/Wittgenstein/Putnam: Wittgenstein assumes that we do not interpret the reference as a causal relationship at all.
>Reference/Wittgenstein.
We find it tempting to imagine that the intentionality of our words is given in the experience of thinking itself. When one is asked "how do you know that it is a thought of so and so? If you immediately think of something like a shadow, a picture, you do not think of a causal relationship.
But:
III 210
Intentionality/WittgensteinVs: the "illusion of inner intentionality" is an illusory notion that reference is a mysterious something that exists while we think.
III 211
Since we do not have an overview of all uses at all, we have no theory of reference at all.
---
V 17
Thought/Putnam: according to many authors thoughts are essentially different from physical objects. They have the characteristic of "intentionality". Nothing physical has "intentionality" unless it is derived from an application by the mind.
PutnamVs: this is a premature postulation of mysterious mental powers.
V 35
Intentionality/Brentano: "Intentionality" makes the mind fit for reference. PutnamVsBrentano: this is not a solution.
>Intentionality/Brentano.
---
I 204f
Intentionality/relativism/positivism/Putnam: it seems to me that both relativists and positivists are troubled by the problem of the intentionality of representation.
Intentionality simply does not seem to fit into our post-Darwinian picture.

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