Glüer II 104 ff
Davidson: the causal relation itself is independent of description. It exists between event tokens, no matter how they are described.
Causal laws, however, operate on the level of description, so they refer to event types.
Causal laws are strict laws, i.e. they apply without distinction. Such laws can only exist in a sealed frame, i.e. a system of nomological sentences.
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McDowell I 100
Causality/Concepts/Davidson/McDowell: the objects that fulfill the sui generis concepts have causal relations with their kind and other things.
But that does not endanger the thesis that causal relations only exist between residents of the realm of the laws of nature.
McDowell: A reason may therefore be a cause, although it is not in causal relations by virtue of its rational relations.
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Rorty VI 179 ff
Causality/Rorty: plays an indispensable role in determining what we say and believe. It is generally impossible to determine beliefs first and then their meaning, and then ask what its causes are.
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Davidson I 59
Causality/Davidson: the causal relations between world and belief are not decisive, because they provide evidence, but because they are recognizable also for others.
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Communication/Davidson.
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Horwich I 452
Causality/Belief/Davidson/Rorty: explanation does not require causality - E.g. how we explain communication with simultaneous presence at same place - we do not know what it would be like for people if they were not there - similarly: e.g. truth has no explanatory use - we do not know what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong.
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
