Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 33
Causality sentences as responses to stimuli.
Graeser I 173
Causality/opportunity sentences/Quine: opportunity sentences provide us with causal hypotheses.
Quine VI 106
Causality/Quine: we have no concept of causality that is as clear as we would like it to be.
When science is particularly strict, it is content with constant correlations. (>Causality/Hume).
VI 107
Disposition/Quine: this term is similar to causality in that it tolerates the substitutability of identity but blocks the predicate calculus.
V 20/21
Def Cause/Quine: cause is ultimately the effect of forces on particles which is energy transmission (>Causality/Vollmer.)
Causality/Quine: I am not interested in the epistemological basis like Hume, but in the ontological nature as the subject of a scientific theory.
Even if the difference between energy and matter has been shaken in modern physics, the concept of cause is not out of place here. On a more abstract level, it simply plays no role.
V 22
Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong waves during a shot.
V 23
Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes, disposition.
Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine.
XI 112
Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: For example, to what kind of events does the crying of geese on the Capitol belong and to what belongs the salvation of Rome?