Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 78 ff
You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence is independent of representation.
>Existence/Kripke, >Description dependence/Kripke, >Presentation.
I 94
Reference by description:
E.g. "Jack the Ripper"
E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counter-example: "Volcano".
I 94f
It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object.
I 93ff
Description does not shorten the name. E.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel.
I 112f
Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length - description provides contingent identity: inventor = post master.
Cf. >Standard meter.
I 115
Identity: through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made.
>Identity/Kripke.
I 117
QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery - (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description - the identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery.
I 25/26
Description/names/Kripke: the description serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning.
I 36
Description is fulfilled: only one sole object fulfils the description, e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water).
Apparent description: e.g. the Holy Roman Empire (was neither holy nor Roman) - it is a hidden proper name.
---
III 353
Description/substitutional quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6)) - this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled.
III 369
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows:
(Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y) - is ambiguous, if there is more than one description: order of elimination.
>Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, cf. >necessary a posteriori.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.