I 320
Elimination of singular descriptions/Quine: there are no more truth value gaps. All are wrong now: "..y .. and only y" instead of "y = (ix) (x .. ..)" when applicable to nothing.
I 328f
Descriptions can be revived. This is possible in all positions. Socrates is then again definable as a singular term. Quotes are names of linguistic structures. They eliminate the characteristic occurrences of the corresponding terms.
II 75 ff
Russell/Theory of Descriptions: a term is not defined by equivalence but through paraphrases. Reference is only simulated, not fixed.
VII (i) 167
Descriptions/Quine: descriptions are singular terms. >
Singular Terms/Quine.
III 279
Description/Synonymy/Quine: whether a description assumption is available at all depends on an appropriate translation, and this in turn depends on the vague concept of synonymy. What is synonymous for us depends on what you first got to know in your individual learning history.
Solution/Quine: we separate logic from empiricism by emphasizing the priority of the predicates: we insist that what we learn through perception is never terms, but only predicates. ((s) We then use these in the descriptions as building blocks.)
III 280
Predicate/Quine: a predicate (instead of description) should then only apply to this (shown) object. Then we explain "(ix)Fx" as the actual name, where "F" stands for this basic predicate. That does not even apply to epistemology.
Description/singular term/Quine: then nothing prevents us anymore to regard all singular terms as descriptions! If, for example, "The author of Waverley" is given, we do not need to stop looking for the correct "F" for translation into the "(ix)Fx" description. We allow the following: "(ix)(x is cerberus)" (>
unicorn as description).
Any less incompetent translation would only differ in its clarity, not in its meaning.
Singular terms/Quine: treating all as descriptios has the advantage,
III 281
to spare a difference to non-descriptive singular terms. The dispute over descriptions becomes one about predicates. >
Predicates/Quine.
III 293
Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence.
>
Equal sign/Quine.
