Lexicon of Arguments

 

I XVIII
SchifferVsCompositionality: we must reject it because we must also reject the theory of relation (without which we cannot have the compositionality).
>Frege principle, >Relation theory/Schiffer.
Understanding/Schiffer: understanding must be explained otherwise:
Solution: Schiffer thesis: conceptual role in neuronal lingua mentis without compositionality.
>Conceptual role, >Lingua mentis, >Language of Thought.

I 183
SchifferVsCompositionality: verbs for propositional attitudes can hardly be put into a compositional semantics.
In addition e.g. "is a picture of", "true", "big", "toy"(soldier) - adverbs, evaluative terms like "should", "good", pronouns and demonstrative pronouns "everyone", "all" are problematic.
Also counterfactual conditional and modal expressions represent a problem for compositional semantics.
>Counterfactual conditionals, >Adverbs, >Adjectives.

I 183
Compositional truth theoretical semantics/Schiffer: attributes truth conditions to sentences.
>Truth conditions.
I 184
Compositionality/SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural language does not need any compositional semantics for understanding.
>Understanding.
For new sentences, we are not confronted with new words and even only with known constructions.
Pro Frege: meaning theory must determine compositional mechanisms, but this does not lead to the fact that the meaning theory must be truth-theoretical (must determine truth conditions).
>Meaning theory, >Truth-conditional semantics.

I 208
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: E.g. "and": the everyday linguistic meaning is not captured by the truth value table.
>Truth table.
Compositional semantics would require that there is a non-logical axiom for each non-logical expression. - This is not possible.
Propositions by E. Harveys spoken language receive their representational character via the connection with mental representation.
>Mental representation.
Therefore Mentalese does not need compositional semantics.
>Mentalese, >Language of thought.