II 253
Conditional/Deflationism/Field: the nonfactualist view is not the only one possible, both classical and non-classical logic can be used. -
>
Nonfactualism.
Disquotational truth: it seems to require truth conditions. - E.g. "If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President" is true iff Clinton dies in office and de Vito becomes President.
>
Disquotationalism.
II 254
Conditional/Facts/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)
(1): Thesis: the conditional facts are not expressible in 1st order logic, but in indicative "If .. then .." clauses.
>
Logic, >
Second order logic.
II 255
Conditional/Factualism/Field: 1st Variant: assumes that "if A, then B" has the same truth conditions as "~A v B".
Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - Non-factualism: seems committed to them.
II 255
Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979)
(2): Thesis: counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless they are true.
There is a conventional implicature for that when we assert "if A, then B", that not only the probability P (A> B) is high, but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A).
Field: the requirement that P(A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P(B I A) is high - "Surface logic" has to do with assertibility.
"Deep logic": says what is truth preserving.
II 256
Factualism: must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e. on the surface) and the acceptability on a deep level.
>
Acceptability.
Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can then distinguish between non-factualism and factualism without using the concepts "true" or "fact".
Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - non-factualism: seems committed to them.
>
Facts.
II 257
Non-Factualism/Field: must assume that the acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability laws governing the acceptance of "fact sentences".
>
Probability laws.
1. Robeert C. Stalnaker. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass: MIT PRess.
2.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review
Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589
