I 272f
Def "Correct"/Wright: here: T-predicate for minimally truth-enabled discourses.
>
Truth predicate, >
Truth evaluability, >
Minimalism, >
Discourse.
>
Truth.
((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.)
Wright I 276
Correctness/Negation/Logics/Truth/Wright: when both truth and correctness are at play, there is a distinction between the
a) actual, strict negation: transforms any true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one that gives another form of negation:
b) Negation: works in such a way that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument reaches no truth.
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Negation, >
Truth.
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal (Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
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Nonfactualism.
A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict concept of the former negation.
Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the predicate of truth will generally be conservative.
WrightVsVs: but there are problems elsewhere now: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional:
(II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition
>
Truth conditions.
I 276/277
And any conservative matrix for "A" is true jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct.
Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct.
The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect.
Meaning Minimalism/correctness/Wright: Correctness cannot regard certain sentences (e.g. about primary qualities of material bodies) as candidates for substantial truth.
>
Content.
The attribution of a truth condition can therefore be correct for such a proposition.
Thus, even in a conservative matrix, the assertion
"S has the truth condition that P" is true
can be correct. But the whole basis of the argumentation is that minimalism of meaning has no choice but to view
"S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition
as inevitably at least incorrect otherwise there is no affirmation of (i) as a premise. ((i): It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition).
The insertion of "S" has the truth condition that "P" for "A" in (II) consequently produces, in a conservative matrix for meaning minimalism itself, a correct antecedence, but an incorrect consequence.
I 277/278
WrightVsBoghossian: Summary: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the disquotation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii),
if, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The proposition is incorrect).
Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argumentation at all.
