Lexicon of Arguments

 

Horwich I 130
Truth criterion/criteria/Tarski: we will probably never find a critoron for truth. - But equally not for most other concepts including physics.⁽¹⁾
>Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion.

1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75
- - -
Skirbekk I 177
Criterion of truth/Tarski: there is no tuth criterion that shows that there is no wrong record of an empirical theory.
((s) The criterion cnnot be found in the sttements - these are different.)
Tarski: Common feature of true propositions: truth, not a criterion as blackness of the coal and whiteness of the snow.⁽²⁾
Cf. >Truth/Quine.

2. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996
- - -
Berka I 492
Truth/criterion/structural/Tarski: a structural truth-criterion allows each statement of the language to effectively allocate a statement that is equivalent to them, which, if it is not quantitative, is obviously true or obviously wrong.
That works in the class calculus.
A structural characteristic of true statements possible if it can be shown that the class of individuals is infinite.
((s) Because then accuracy/provability coincide).
>general criterion of truth.
>Definitions/Tarski, >Correctness, >Provability.
I 502
Criterion of truth/structural/Tarski: is given to us in that we find that the concept of the true statement (from §3) and the one of the provable theorem (due to the matrix method) are of the same scope.
>Term scope.
Problem: this is only true for simple languages - (i.e. with only a single semantic category E.g. only individuals).⁽³⁾
>Semantic categories.

3. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935