Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 33
In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong.
>Constructivism.
I 40
Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle.
I 78f
Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else.
>Reduction, >Reductionism.
I 118
The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity.
I 182
The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena.
I 183
This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following:
The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought.
The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.
>Object of thought, >Object of belief, >Intensional object.
- - -
II 68
Representation: there is no ontology tied to representation.
>Representation.
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V 163
Ontology: main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites?
>Criteria.
V 164
Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable.
Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless.
Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes and only the entities that it says exist. (This does not have to be done explicitly.)
V 165
Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it.
It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one.
SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine).
>Ontology/Quine.
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Stalnaker I 181
Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories.
>Identification principle.

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