Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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VI 428
Experience/Rorty: the only interesting, because epistemologically relevant meaning of this term is the one that does not go back to empeiria, but to ta phainomena.
"Phenomenon"/Rorty: can exist with absolutely "no connection" to nature - one of two things may change while the other remains the same.
>Experience, >Sensation, >Qualia, >Phenomena, >Sensory impression.
- - -
Frank I 595
Phenomenalism/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, can not explain disposition. ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can only be described.) - He cannot explain why counterfactual conditionals are true.
>Counterfactual conditional.

Richard Rorty (I970b). Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

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