Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 404
If one stands up for sense data (learning by stimuli), one at best opposes physicalism and not nominalism.
>Nominalism/Quine.
I 456
Is physicalism now a denial of mental objects, or is it a theory about them? "Schmidt is in pain," and "Schmidt is angry," is said of the same thing.
I 457
Tame physicalism can perhaps be characterized as follows: it explains that there are no irreconcilable categorial differences between the mental and the physical.
If e.g. it concerns whether solids consist of swarms of molecules, there is nothing to decide. However, when we declare mental states as physical states, it is not the case that we paraphrase the standard contexts of mental expressions into independently declared contexts of physical expressions: The partial expression "Schmidt is" (from "Schmidt is in pain") and the partial expression "Schmidt is" (from "Schmidt is angry") remain unchanged. They are merely understood to have physical complements instead of mentalistic ones.

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