II 80
Predicates/Wittgenstein: the use of predicates is always misleading in logic, since it indicates different "types" of terms, etc., which are differentiated by predicates, for example: "formally confirmed", "internal relations".
The description by predicates must have the possibility that it is different!
II 82
Experience/Wittgenstein: is not distinguished by predicates from what is not experience. It is a logical term, not a term like "chair" or "table". >
Experience, >
Reality, >
Properties.
II 157
Individual/Atom/Atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to come across the basic elements ("individuals") through the logical analysis. Russell believed that in the end subject-predicate sentences and double-digit relations would result. >
Objects, >
Individuals.
WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken idea of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. >
Atomism.
II 306f
Predicate/WittgensteinVsRussell: For example "man" should not be used as a predicate - otherwise the subject would become a proper name. "Man" as a predicate: at best for a disguised woman. >
Proper names.
II 307
"Man" as a predicate cannot be denied to its bearer.
- - -
Hintikka I 64
Colour predicates/Colour Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at first glance, their incompatibility violates Wittgenstein's principle of independence from elementary propositions.
I 65
Hintikka: but from the logical simplicity of the colours does not follow that they do not have a "logical form" that allows only some connection possibilities and others do not. The problem is only to design an appropriate symbolism that reflects the scope.
I 71
Def Existence/Wittgenstein: a predicate of higher order is articulated only by the existential quantifier. (Frege ditto).
I 72
Hintikka: Many philosophers think that this is only a technical implementation of the older idea that existence is not a predicate.
I 156 et seqq.
Phenomenology/Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there is often the view that a phenomenalistic or phenomenological interpretation of the Tractatus is made impossible by the phenomenon of color incompatibility and also otherwise by any other apparent dependence between simple phenomenalistic predicates of the same kind. (HintikkaVs)
Colours/Predicates/Colour Incompatibility/Hintikka: In this view, "red" and "green" cannot refer to simple objects, because otherwise the two elementary propositions "this is red" and "this is green", which are mutually exclusive, would not be independent of each other.
But this is not possible according to 2,062: "The existence or non-existence of one fact cannot be taken as an indication of the existence or non-existence of another. >
Existence, >
Non-existence, >
Existence statements.
I 170
Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein understands form as something that can be illustrated by a suitable logical notation. For example, the difference between a two-digit and a one-digit predicate.
In 5.55 ff Wittgenstein argues that such differences in form cannot be predicted a priori. >
a priori.
I 172
Colour/colour words/Colour concepts/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is clear that he insists that colour attributions have no subject-predicate form. >
Colour.
- - -
VI 70
Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Schulte: are not ordinary sentences, they are characterized by the fact that they cannot contradict each other. (Tractatus4.211).
1. This is the first time said that they do not contain any logical particles, otherwise they would have to contradict each other!
2. Their components do not have any complexes, otherwise it would be possible to derive an objection. >
Complex, >
Contradiction.
Accordingly, there are no predicates ("table", "left of") in elementary propositions!
What does remain?
"The elementary proposition consists of names." (Tractatus 4.22).
