Frank I 396
Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts.
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Thoughts, >
Thoughts/Frege, >
Sense.
The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content.
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Thought content, cf. >
Thought objects.
The meaning corresponds to the role of words.
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Conceptual role, >
Words, >
Word meaning.
The same role creates another de re proposition in any context.
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Sentences, >
Propositions, >
Context, >
de re.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55
James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986
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I 409f
Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical.
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Indexicality, >
Index words.
New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition.
VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained.
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Opacity, >
Substitutability.
Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term.
Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable.
Cf. >
He/He himself.
Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean".
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de re.
Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful.
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Quantification.
Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I").
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Sugar trail example.
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I 455f
Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it.
Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time.
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Extra-Sense/Castaneda.
Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul.
VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states.
People understand sentences but do not form beliefs.
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Understanding, >
Self-identification, >
Self-knowledge.
List of extra senses for everyone: too long.
Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language.
Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this".
Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough.
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Reference, >
Sense.
The same meaning cannot perform different references.