Graeser I 129
SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are no language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perform this function.
>
Content.
SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought.
>
Representation, >
Language of thought.
Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation.
>
Relation theory.
Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses.
Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet.
---
Schiffer I XVIIff
SchifferVsPropositions/late: propositions should contain E.g. dog property.
Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences.
Problem: there are no truth conditions in mentalese.
>
Mentalese, >
Truth conditions.
I 14
Propositions: have their truth values essentially.
Phrases/expressionsSchiffer: have their truth values contingently. - (in public speech or in mentalese)
Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented.
I 49f
Propositions/Belief object/relation theory/SchifferVsPropositions: a proposition always requires natural kind terms.
Even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory.
Propositional theory: says
1) that "p" is a real object variable
2) that propositions are their values.
Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components.
E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY".
But only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties). - They are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations.
>
Pain, >
Mental representation.
"Thought"/Frege: = Proposition; also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow.
Problem: VsPropositions: they carry an ontological commitment to Platonism.
>
Platonism.
I 51
SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are superfluous such as facts and features. - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...). - This is a doubling.
Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties.
Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of)
Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white.
Different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components.
>
Fine-grained/coarse-grained.
I 52
Proposition: different: if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers do not function as components. - Then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white.
Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical. - Then the problem of logical omniscience follows.
>
Omniscience.
Solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine.
