I 176
Secondary Qualities/Esfeld: in secondary qualities the answer-dependence refers not only to the acquisition, but also to the content. Acquisition: when something red, which was surrounded by darkness, comes to light, it will appear red.
Contents: content is the contrast individuated by the inferential role.
I 175
Def "Global response dependence" with respect to the acquisition of concepts: "Global response dependence" is (...) a necessary condition for the acquisition of the concept F, that something is F only if being F involves the disposition to appear...to the members.
The careful phrase "includes" is meant to avoid implying that the property must be dispositional.
This global response dependence is sufficient for a social theory of rule-following.
Content/appearance: but the content need not say anything about F appear. The content is determined by the inferences.
I 176
This blocks the step to noumenal realism.
>
Metaphysical realism, >
Realism.
Response dependence allows us to introduce a category of terms for secondary qualities:
Def Terms for Secondary Qualities/Esfeld: Terms for secondary qualities are precisely those for which response dependence refers not only to acquisition but also to content. Ex It is part of the content of "comfortable" that persons appear comfortable.
>
Secondary qualities, >
Primary qualities.
Content/acquisition/conditions/response dependence/asfield: difference: not all things belonging to the extension have to be such that they really trigger the disposition to classify them as F (secondary quality).
>
Content, >
Dispositions, >
Behavior, >
Meaning.
We don't have to assume that our answers are enough to fix the extension!
Ex things which are surrounded by darkness during their whole existence.
Yet being red includes the disposition to appear red (if they were brought to light).
Thus the content conditions are shifted to the acquisition conditions.
Vs: One might object that this would merely allow us to know the effects that a thing has by appearing F to us.
I 177
So we have no reason to infer nature.
Esfeld: In fact, this can be understood as blocking epistemic access to the thing itself.
Response dependence/appearance/Esfeld: Response dependence does not mean that F to appear involves a property in persons that mediates epistemic access.
Response can be triggered very indirectly by sophisticated instruments.
Response dependency/Esfeld: The biconditional sentence can be read in both directions:
1. from left to right: if something is F, then it appears so under normal conditions.
2. from right to left: If something appears so under normal conditions, then it is also F.
Vs: The latter could compromise realism.
>
Appearance, >
Appearance/Sellars.
I 177/178
But that depends on how we understand circumstances (normal conditions).
Circumstances/Esfeld: Circumstances are found out by judging our actions as correct or incorrect by sanctions. Thus we find out the conditions in which our dispositions to continue a given series converge.
But we don't need to identify the normal conditions with the specific conditions under which we converge!
Esfeld: We can figure out the conditions of our converging and thus determine the conceptual content, but at the same time view it as aiming at a determination of the conditions under which we have access to things as they are. ((s) Reversal.)
Thus, this view of response dependence does not compromise realism.
Truth is not determined by our practices!
>
World/thinking, >
Practice.
