Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Theses I
Theses II

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Hintikka I 113
Quality/Wittgenstein: at least some statements in which a degree is attributed to an experienced quality is also an atomic sentence.
Elementary Proposition/Wittgenstein's example for elementary propositions: "Here is green". (> Sentences/Strawson, Statements/Strawson, Attribution/Strawson).
I 202
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the base of the "logical" structure: is made of rows of temporary total experiences out of which qualities are formed - unlike sense data. CarnapVsRussell: individual experience must be added: "sensation". Hintikka: these are similar to the objects of Wittgenstein. Difference: Carnap: ephemeral, psychologically - Wittgenstein: is not temporal but a substance of the world. Sensation/Carnap: sensation belongs to psychology, quality belongs to the phenomenology and theory of objects. Phenomenology/Carnap: is a holistic analysis of the experience.
I 202 ff
Quality/Experience/Carnap/Hintikka: the basis of Carnap's "Construction" is a series of current overall experiences from which qualities are formed.
I 203
But not even qualities resemble the sense data of Russell's conception.
CarnapVsRussell/CarnapVsSense Data/Carnap: individual experience must be added.
Carnap: "If we want to distinguish the two similar components of the two elementary experiences, we must not only describe them according to their quality, but also add the indication of the elementary experience to which they belong.
Only such a component is an individual component in the true sense, we want to call it "sensation" in contrast to the component that is represented in the quality class according to its quality only.
These "sensations" are thus similar to Wittgenstein's objects. But according to Carnap, they are ephemeral, subjective and time-bound,
while the Tractatus objects form the non-temporal "objective" substance of the world.
According to Carnap: "Sensations belong to the field of psychology, qualities to phenomenology or object theory".
Phenomenology/Carnap/Hintikka: in Carnap limited to a holistic analysis of experience.
- - -
II 138
Atomism/VsAtomism/Self-criticism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: it was a mistake that there were elementary propositions into which all propositions could be broken down. This error has two roots:
1. That infinity is understood as a number, and assuming there is an infinite number of sentences.
2. Statements that express degrees of quality. ((s) They do not have to exclude every other sentence. Therefore, they cannot be independent).
- - -
III 141
Def Fact/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Flor: Combination of simple objects without quality features! The facts are completely independent of each other. Example: in the Tractatus there is neither an example for a fact nor for an object!
The representation of all objects in proportion to their positions also covers all facts.
III 142
There must be an absolute distinction between the simple and the complex.

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