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III 25
Rationality/Habermas: has less to do with acquisition than with the use of knowledge. Knowledge can be criticized as unreliable.
III 26
This is where the ability to justify comes into play. For example, actions which the actor himself/herself considers to be hopeless cannot be justified.
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Justification , >
Reasons , >
Contradictions , >
Knowledge .
III 30
Rationality/Realism/Phenomenology/Habermas: two approaches differ in the way propositional knowledge is used:
a) The "realistic" position is based on the ontological premise of the world as the epitome of what is the case, in order to clarify on this basis the conditions of rational behaviour. The realist can limit himself/herself to the conditions for objectives and their realization.
b) The "phenomenological" position reflects on the fact that the rational actors themselves must presuppose an objective world.
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Propositional knowledge .
III 31
It makes the ontological preconditions a problem and asks about the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. It must be regarded by the subjects as one and the same world in order to gain objectivity.
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Lifeworld , >
Rationality/Pollner .
III 33
The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality, derived from the realistic approach, can be added to the broader phenomenological concept of rationality. There are relationships between the ability of decentral perception and manipulation of things and events on the one hand and the ability of intersubjective communication on the other. (See also
Cooperation/Piaget ), >
Cooperation .
III 36
Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their lifeworld would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions.
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Descriptions , >
Predication , >
Attribution , cf. >
Score keeping .
III 44
Those who use their own symbolic means of expression dogmatically behave irrationally.
Cf. >
Language use .
IV 132
Rationality/Habermas: we can trace the conditions of rationality back to conditions for a communicatively achieved, justified consensus. Linguistic communication, which is designed for communication and does not merely serve to influence one another, fulfils the prerequisites for rational expressions or for the rationality of subjects capable of speaking and acting. The potential for rationalization (...) can be released (...) to the extent that the language fulfils functions of communication (and) coordination of action (...) and thus becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take place.
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Language/Habermas .
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Rorty I I 92
RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to put communicative reason in the place of "subject-centered reason", is in itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how".
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Communicative action/Habermas , >
Communication theory/Habermas ,
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Communication/Habermas , >
Communicative practice/Habermas ,
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Communicative rationality/Habermas , >
RortyVsHabermas .