Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 146 ~
Justification/McDowell/Esfeld: thesis: the space of reasons (justifications) is further than that of the conceptual.
>Space of reasons, >Concepts, >Conceptual role, >Language dependence.
I 161 ~
I-you-relations/Brandom/Esfeld: I-you-relations show in contrast to relativistic I-we-relationships that the community as a whole can be wrong. I-we: I-we is the myth of the given. I-you: I-you replaces representationalism by inferentialism.
I- you-relationship.
There is no enforcement of consensus, the community has no privileged status.
>Myth of the given.
I 191ff
Justification/belief/Esfeld: justification is only possible by other beliefs because these have statement form - but circumstances are not sufficient, however inferential practices are. Ultimately, we need the coherence theory. Social holism: only beliefs are isolated from the world, nothing in the world is conceptual (VsMcDowell).
>Beliefs/McDowell, >Holism, >Beliefs.
But beliefs are bound to the world by not being epistemically self-sufficient. (Epistemically self-contained: the content of belief state is ontological dependent on physical texture.)
>Belief state, >Content.

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