Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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I 177
Proposition/sentence/truth/knowledge/identification/Evans: (1982)(1) e.g. Julius is the (rigid) name of the inventor of the zipper (whoever it was) - then "Julius was born in Minsk" expresses a particular proposition about a particular individual, but we do not know who the individual is, i.e. we do not know what proposition is expressed by the sentence.
I 180f
Reference/Stalnaker: we have two images about language and thinking, repsectively, about an object:
a) directly by virtue of a causal relation (Kripke)
>Kripke
b) indirectly through our sensing... (Frege)
>Frege
...and expressions of purely qualitative terms that are instantiated by certain things.
Does this lead to essentialism in Kripke’s opinion?
>Essentialism.
SearleVsMill: direct reference (without an intermediary sense) leads into a metaphysical trap: separation of object and properties.
>Cf. >Properties/Quine.
Solution/Stalnaker: properly understood, it is about the modal properties of a thing. ((s) It could have been different).
>Modal properties.

1. Evans, G. (1982): 'The Varieties of Evidence' (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), p. 31.

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