Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 8
Relation Theory/Schiffer: "There is something that he believes" - can only be inferred with referential quantification (not with substitutional quantification) .
Substitutional Quantification: is true if a substitution instance of "Elmer believes that S" is true.
Referential Quantification: "..believes x" whereby an x must exist.
Substitutional Quantification: allows no relation theory because the substitutional quantification is consistent with every representation of the logical form of substitution instances that make the quantification true.

I 15
Relation Theory/Schiffer: Relation to sentences: Davidson (1969)⁽¹⁾: to the public language of the attributing.
Carnap (1947)⁽²⁾: to the public language of the believer.
Loar: public language of the attributing, but the semantic attributes (which determine the content) are in the Tarski-style (non-public). -Then there is nothing about the role of expressions or use in population.
>Language use, >Language community.
Problem: then beliefs must be individuated by interpersonal functional states - that does not work with Tarski.
>Truth definition/Tarski.

1. Donald Davidson (1969). "The individuation of events". In: In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 216-34
2. Rudolf carnap (1947). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press
---
I 70
SchifferVsPropositionalism/VsRelation Theory with proposition as an object: if true, the proposition would include as content either dog property itself (this does not work because of shmog) or way of givenness of it.
Way of givenness: We have no clue what it should be.
>Way of givenness.
I 73
Relation Theory/Schiffer: here for representation (= sentences) in mentalese (instead of propositions).
>Sentences, >Propositions.
Meaning in mentalese determines meaning in public language, not vice versa. (+)
>Mentalese (Laguage of thought), >Everyday language.