II 55
Representations/Field: if they were only related to public language, why then internal? - Solution: distinction type/token. - Question: why then referring to public language: because one can only speak with respect to types of tokens.
>
Type/Token, >
Everyday language, >
Observation language, cf. >
Theory language.
II 58
Representations: their syntax can be determined without regard to the meanings - if we have laws for body movements from wishes, etc. (narrow psychological theory).
>
Syntax, >
Meaning, >
Behavior, >
Desire, >
Explanation.
II 58
Semantics/Representation: We can make truth superfluous: if we have
1. laws of beliefs from stimuli
2. laws for body movements from beliefs and desires.
That would be the "narrow psychological theory": then we do not need to assume meanings in representation.
II 59
But if representation should be true, it must be correlated with meanings.
>
Presentation.
II 60
Representation without meaning: E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1 > S2] and desires S2, then he also wants S1.
Field: Meanings is not needed because the believed sentences can all be wrong. - E.g. Radical Interpretation: the native raises his rifle: a reason to believe that a rabbit is nearby - (even if he is deceived).
>
Gavagai, >
Radical interpretation.
II 61
Representation/semantics/psychology: for their psychological explanations, we do not need the semantic notions like "true" and "refers to", which usually sets sentences in relation to the world.
Belief/truth: nothing compels me to assume of a person that she has believes that are true of rabbits. - ((s) It is enough when he lifts his rifle.)
Truth (of internal representations): we only need this if we assume that they are reliable indicators about the world. - E.g. a child behaves guiltily - For example, if a mathematician believes in a theory, it is a reason for me to believe it, too.
>
Reliability.
II 66
Language/representation/Schiffer: early: (Schiffer, 1972)
(1): The meaning of a sentence can be explained only by the notions of believe and desire. For example, to know the meaning of "Caesar was egoistic," one must know that the proposition is conventionally correlated with believe that Caesar was egoistic.
>
Representation/Schiffer.
Everything goes through inner representations and these can be explained without further reference to language.
FieldVsSchiffer: the symbols in my representation system have gained their role by appropriation of e.g. a name in the public language.
>
Language use, >
Language community.
Animals/Field: although they are likely to have representations, meanings and therefore truth cannot be applied to them.
>
Animal language, >
Animals.
II 69
Representation/Field: one could also assume this as neither linguistic nor pictoral: E.g. "light bulb model" - that would be uninterpreted and could not explain behavior.
II 77f
Representation: representative terms can replace properties. - Most psychology can do without them.
Advantages: Intentional terms are projective. E.g.: "He raised his rifle ...". - The truth conditions do not matter then. - The advantage of representations lies in the combination of explanation and predictions.
>
Truth conditions, >
Predictions.
II 94
Representation/StalnakerVsField: the basic relation is between words rather than between sentences or "morphemes". Not even between whole states.
>
Words, cf. >
Word meaning.
Field: that could be correct.
II 154
Representation/truth conditions/translation: one can accept representation without translation and without truth conditions: solution: one accepts reactions to his believe and a corresponding threshold for his reaction.
Crazy cases: e.g. the person believes that something quite different is represented .
Solution: the role cannot be specified exactly, but the objective core is that there is a role.
Explanation 2nd order: "sufficient similarity to our own representation" E.g. "Khrushchev blinked" as an explanation for Kennedy's action.
Problem: our own representations are not objective.
Deflationism: for it this is not a problem.
>
Deflationism.
Truth conditions: we only need them if we do not know how the details of the explanation are.
1. Schiffer, St. 1972. Meaning. New York, NY, USA: Oxford, Clarendon Press
