Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor's image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have adopted. What is decisive is that with respect to Fodor's "Language of thought" the skeptical question "how exactly do the internal representations represent reality?" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
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Fodor IV ~ 122
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: having a thought is not an action, therefore it is not subject to beliefs like speech acts. >Speech act, >Belief, >Thinking, >Actions.
IV 124
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: today: representations have functional roles qua constituents of propositional attitude but the content must not depend metaphysically nor conceptually on their functional role. >Functional role, >Content.
IV 126
Representation/tradition/Fodor/Lepore: their explanation does not use beliefs, wishes, etc. so the causal role is determined only by non-semantic properties. Representations are not used for anything.
Computation/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: the causal role of representations is governed by the same syntactic properties that affect their compositionality. >Compositionality.
IV 128
Not representations are interpreted, but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. The representations themselves are also inaccessible to radical interpretation.
IV 127f
Interpretation: objects are not representations but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc.
IV 201
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and as aunts as aunts (not as objects with certain psychophysical properties). Otherwise we could find out anything with introspection. There are very different interpretations of its diagrams (VsConnectionism). >Connectionism.
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Newen I 133
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor presumes localizable, specifiable representations.
VsFodor: today you rather assume neuronal networks. Representation: is preconceptual, e.g. spatial orientation.

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