Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 139/40
There are terms that are too simple to argue about. E.g. the content of arithmetic assertions like "57 + 65 = 122" does not say anything about consensus and has therefore no logical consequences.
>Arithmetics/Wittgenstein.
I 216
Representation/Wright: ...in contrast, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles have to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction.
>Cognitive coercion, >Correctness/Wright.
I 284
Understanding/representation/Wittgenstein: Understanding is rather to be explained by a "sense for" something than by representation of something, or through perception (Wright: e.g. humor).
 Wright: does the perhaps sub-cognitive not disappear if we formulate it metalinguistically?
>Metalanguage.
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Rorty VI 41ff
Representation/Wright: not merely permissible formulation but philosophically correct, two-digit approach of the truth predicate.
>Truth predicate.
(DavidsonVsScheme/contents (3. Dogma): "true" may not be two-digit).
>Scheme/content/Davidson.