Frank I 129
Martians’ pain/LewisVsQuine/Vsnaturalised epistemology - physicalist vocabulary needs not to be true.
Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical
Review 83 (1974), 435-450
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Lewis I 39f
Pain/Lewis: a theory of mind should not exclude the possibility of shifted pain (same conditions, contrasting effect) and Martian pain: other states, same impact) - but there should be a simple sense of pain, where we can have all the pain - Shifted pain/Martians’ pain: show that causal role, pain and physical realization are only linked contingently.
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I (c) 41
Problem: how can we characterize pain a priori by causal role, despite the acknowledgment of this fact? - Identity theory solves the problem for Shifted Pain, but fails on Martians’ Pain. - Behaviorism: here the situation is reversed.
I (c) 42
Pain/Lewis: if a particular neural state preferably causes pain, then this state is pain - but the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state. - The concept of ...- is an intentional functor. - The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different - Pain would have been something else. - It could have been that the owner of the role does not own it and some non-owner owns it. - Lewis/Armstrong: pain is non-rigid - yet no coincidence of two states (pain plus neuronal state) but one single state.
- - -
I (b) 33 ff
Pains are so defined by what the majority usually ...
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I (c) 40
Shifted pain: same states - different impacts. From this we learn that pain is merely linked contingently with its causal role.
I (c) 42
Martians’ pain: other states (than ours) - Same effect. From this we learn that pain is linked merely contingently with its physical realization.
But the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state! (>
concepts,>
identity).
I (c) 42
The concept of .. is an intentional functor. The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different.
Lewis/Armstrong: The concept of pain is a non-rigid designator!
I (c) 52
Identity pain/neural state: contingent! LL. But I do not say that we have two states.
If the person feels pain, it is pain, no matter what kind of causal role or physical condition the state has. Otherwise it is not pain.
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Schwarz I 146
Pain/Lewis/Schwarz: state with such and such causal role- ((s) then biochemical state (type) with the same causal role: Therefore, identification through precisely this role - (s) Vs (s): then circular:>
theory of reference.
