I 17
Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantic facts: meta-semantic facts are e.g. which language is spoken in a possible world - or whether we interpret the language with our language from the real world or with the one they speak there - or if we actually denote the language of the real world or the local language of the possible worlds from the perspective of the possible worlds itself. These facts ensure that our signs have the representational properties that they have. On these facts, it depends what is said or thought.
Cf. >
Semantic facts.
I 82
Semantics/syntax/language-independent/Stalnaker: the step from syntax to semantics frees the theory from language dependence.
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Language dependence.
I 149
Modal Semantics/Stalnaker: modal semantics should allocate a separate range to each possible world ((s) but then you can no longer call possible worlds "ways of how things could be").
I 191
Semantics/Stalnaker/(s): semantics is the meanig from the real world. Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is the meaning from respective possible worlds because meta-semantics asks by which facts the semantic value is created and the facts must be from the respective possible world.
I 192
Semantics: semantics says which semantic values have the expressions of a language. Meta-semantics: meta-semantic says what facts determine the semantic values.
Pre-Semantics/Kaplan: pre-semantics refers to those who believe that a name that is at the end of a historic chain means something.
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David Kaplan.
Semantics/Kaplan: semantics rather gives us the meaning than telling us how it could be discovered.
this is similar to Kripke.
I 196
Possible world/actual world/meta-semantics/MS/Stalnaker: meta-semantics: takes into account the facts that determine the semantic values, i.e. ultimately it takes into account the differences between possible worlds. Therefore, meta-semantics is suitable if you want to consider a possible world as actual world. It is the meta-semantically understood primary intension of a statement that provides the information that we want to transmit.
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Intensions/Stalnaker.
I 199
Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically - not semantically.
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Twodimensional semantics.
Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is fact based, therefore we do not have access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must take internal states.
I 213/14
Semantics/meta-semantics/semantics/Stalnaker: e.g. assuming we can only say how things possibly are, given the facts, how they actually are. Then: semantics: the set S only expresses the proposition Q under condition P. Meta-semantics: sentence S expresses only a conditional proposition, not a singular one, i.e. not the content depends on the facts, but it is relative itself.
