I 13
Descartes: I cannot distinguish alertness from dream.
Stroud:
1. the possibility that he dreams is really a threat to his knowledge of the world.
2. But he does not need to know whether he is dreaming to know something about the world.
No knowledge: if one dreams E.g. that the shutters rattle and the dream caused it, one does not know that it rattles - (false causation, defies identity of the event).
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Causal theory of knowledge, >
Causation.
I 17
Alone the possibility of deception is sufficient.
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Deceptions.
I 18
StroudVsDescartes: we can know sometimes that we are not dreaming - knowing that we do not dream is the condition for knowledge.
I 37
Intersubjectivity: it also is affected by Descartes' skepticism.
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Intersubjectivity, cf. >
Solipsism.
I 77
Platitudes/skepticism/Stroud: natural strategy VsSkepticism: e.g. The objective world was there before us. - E.g. I believe that a mountain in Africa is more than 5000m high. - That is completely independent of my knowledge. - Then it is not about assertibility conditions or truth conditions.
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Reality, >
Assertibility conditions, >
Assertibility, >
Truth conditions, >
Empiricism.
Otherwise: if you believe that we now know more about physics than 200 years ago, a reference to community and knowledge is implied - now truth condition and assertibility condition but still objectivity.
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Objectivity.
Aeroplane-example: whether the manual is correct or not, is an objective fact that can be seen from the distanced position.
Distanced position: equivalent to skepticism - and at the same time determination that inside and outside diverge.
Inside: corresponds to our social practice.
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inside/outside.
I 87
Philosophical skepticism/Stroud: its problem is not empirical.
I 110
Skepticism/Stroud: it is not sufficient to put forward a specific case - Descartes makes an assessment of all our knowledge.
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Knowledge.
I 270
Imaginability/Stroud: it is hard to say whether something is conceivable or not - a possibility would be to imagine it and see what happens.
Vs: but that is not conclusive, since it may be that what my thoughts make possible for me, is even hidden from me.
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Conceivability.
I 272f
Dream/skepticism/Stroud: We have not yet asked if the dream opportunity is knowable to others. - StroudVs(s): we can very well "be all in the same boat" - I can use myself instead of Descartes.
Stroud: I always say: it seems possible.
Imaginability: requires comprehensibility. - And the possibility is comprehensible that we all dream - and then the question is whether I am dreaming, completely independent from the fact if someone else knows. - Then it is possible that all dream and nobody knows anything - and the skepticism is not to sit in opposition, thereby that it contradicts its premises.
Conclusion: dream possibility: there is ultimately one because the possibility that someone knows something must not be presupposed.
Stroud pro Descartes.
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Skepticism/Descartes, >
René Descartes.
