I 279ff
Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge".
>
Belief, >
Knowledge.
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II 319
Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement.
>
Theory.
II 330
Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics. - Several analytical hypotheses are not only possible but necessary.
>
Analytical hypotheses.
ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions.
Aristotle: language is rather associated with actions.
VsQuine: it is not evident that similarities can be localized in a room. - Principles, not "learned sentences".
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Principles, >
Similarity, >
Reference.
II 333
VsQuine: language cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential.
II 343
Perhaps language does not have to be taught.
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Graeser I 121f
Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication?
Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite.
>
Communication, >
Representation.
Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them.
Meaning/VsGrice: we can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle.
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Münch III 320
Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: language is not a natural kind.
>
Natural kinds.
Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992
