Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Concepts
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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I (e) 113
Language/Davidson: Conventions and rules do not explain language, language explains them. >Rules, >Conventions, >Explanation.
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Glüer II 54
Thesis: the term of language is superfluous. There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists claim.
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Rorty II 21
Davidson/Rorty: "How language works" has little to do with the question "how knowledge works."
DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is no instrumental character system, neither of expression nor representation.
Davidson: There is no such thing as a language, there is nothing you can learn or master. (These are rather provisional theories). There are no conventions how we communicate!
Davidson: we should come to worship no one at all, everything, our language, consciousness, community, are products of time and chance.
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Brandom I 922
Language/Davidson: is merely practical, hypothetical necessity, convenient for the community to have it - decisive: how someone would like to be understood - not to make up content before mutual interpretations. >Content, >Propositional content, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation.
Brandom I 518
Language Davidson: interprets linguistic expressions as an aspect of the intentional interpretation of actions - pro top down - Tarski: whether top-down or bottom-up.
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Glüer II 51
Language/Davidson: each is accessible through the causal relationships - this ultimately irrelevant for the truth-theory, which is the actual spoken language. >Truth theory.
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Brandom I 454
Language/Davidson/Rorty: is not a conceptual schema, but causal interaction with the environment - described by the radical interpretation. Then one can no longer ask whether the language "fits" into the world. >Conceptual scheme.
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Rorty III 33
Language/DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is not medium, neither of expression nor of representation. - Wrong questions: e.g. "What place have values?" - E.g. "Are colors more conscious dependent than weights?" - Correct: "Does our use of these words stand in the way of our use of other words?" >Use.
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Rorty VI 133
Language/Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as a language. (> Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs")(1): there is no set of conventions that one would have to learn when one learns to speak. No abstract structure that must be internalized.
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Seel III 28
Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium - but mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts.
Language does not stand between us and the world - seeing: we do not see through the eyes but with them.
VsMentalese/language of thought: does not exist. - Language is a part of us. - It is an organ of us. - It is the way we have the world. >Mentalese.
Medium/Davidson/Seel: here use is very narrow.
Medium/Gadamer: is not an instrument, but an indispensable element of thought.

1. Davidson, D. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" in: LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, New York 1986.

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