I 11 ff
Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto).
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Husted IV 448
DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: Language is not an idiolect, but common language prevails. (>
Two Dogmas/Dummett).
1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition".
2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use".
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McDowell I 152
Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication
2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary.
Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. ((s) Cf. >
Gadamer.)
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Dummett III (b) 81
Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences.
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III (c) 145
Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them.
III (c) 150
The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa.
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Horwich I 461
Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s) >
satisfaction ,not >
making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red".
(1) - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett.
1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
