Rorty III 40
Wittgenstein: naturalizes consciousness and language, in which all questions about relations to the universe are transformed in causal questions. (Also Ryle and Dennett). >
Causality, >
Causal relation, cf. >
Naturalism.
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Rorty VI 134
Language/Wittgenstein: You cannot find a method with which it is possible to step between the language and the object. >
Reality, >
World, >
Perception.
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Hintikka I 22
Language/ontology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one cannot specify in the language, how many objects there are. - These are given by name. - ((s) one can well give a list - Wittgenstein: The existence of an object cannot be expressed - only through the use of the name in the language. >
Use, >
Names.
I 41
Language relativism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Could a lion talk, we would not understand him." (I 323 Hintikka: a lion has other sensory data) - Hintikka: in mathematics, there is no "common behavior". - In different systems different sentences are true and false. >
Truth values.
I 190
Basic physical language/explanation/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "metaphysics" - (> Large typescript) - Instead: phenomenology is grammar. - E.g. one should not decide whether two red circles on a blue background are two objects or one. - Each transcription must depend on the one of the first sentence. - Uncertainty about the grammar - Hintikka: a) the objects are the colors - b) the objects are the spots. - Both phenomenological. - Both are secondary to the language of physical objects and their properties. - Wrong question: how many objects are there. >
Grammar, >
Metaphysics.
WittgensteinVsPhenomenology: this wanted to decide how many objects there are.
I 255
Language/Wittgenstein/Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242/Hintikka: language is not a calculus. - It has no concrete defined rules - not that the rules were vague - but the question arises only in the context of language games. >
Language game, >
Rules.
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II 60
Language/signal/Wittgenstein: E.g. resolution characters in music: is a signal in the strict sense. - Language does not consist of signals. - A signal must be explained. - In the same sense as colors. - In addition to the color word "green" we still need something extra.
II 226f
Language/Wittgenstein: there are actually no gaps in our language - even if there are not enough words to describe the changes of the sky. - It is also not a shortage of our vision that we cannot count the raindrops. - Also impossibility can be expressed - E.g. that an object would be simultaneously green and red - solution: it is excluded by arbitrary convention.
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VI 74
Language/Tractatus/Schulte: language disguises the thought - from the outer form one cannot infer the form of thought - it can be formed according to quite different purposes.
VI 116
Language/purpose/Wittgenstein/Schulte: one can do anything with the language, but none of these purposes determines the nature of language. Not even such a thing as understanding or "expression of thoughts". >
Understanding, >
Interpretation, >
Thoughts.
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Tetens VII 74
Language/facts/Tractatus/Tetens: Question: Could there also be an irreducible sign for each fact? Then no two fact-signs would have common elements (e.g. words). - Problem: then it could not be shown that an object is found in several situations. >
Facts, >
Signs.
VII 75
Logic: would be impossible. ((s) No conclusions, no syllogisms)>
fine-grained/coarse-grained.
