Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I (e) 101
Subjectivity/Davidson: it is a mistake to assume our subjective states could be independent from the rest of the world in that way as they are.
I (e) 103
Subjectivity/fulfillment/short-beaked echidna/porcupine/hedgehog/Fodor: fulfillment by subjective condition: thought about animals that meet certain general criteria (exactly the ones we use for the decision).
I (e) 104
DavidsonVsFodor: these states do not exist - instead: history of learning the word.
>Causal theory of knowledge, >Beliefs/Davidson, >Language acquisition.
I (e) 105
Subjectivity/stitch: scientific psychology: mental states are rather propositional, but not in direct connection with wishes, beliefs , etc. - but for the explanation of behavior, subjectively only as characteristic for the person - this must not be able to state the state.
I (e) 105f
Subjectivity/Davidson: Summary:
1. Mental states are identified by a social context - as sunburn by the sun
2. Nevertheless, both are physical
3. That mental states are identified by causal relationships with the objects is essential for communication.
4. VsSeparation Scheme/Content: Cartesian: mind as a passive observer
5. no "objects of thought" - thoughts are private, yet they belong to the common world. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Conceptual schemes, >Cartesianism.
The mere possibility of thoughts demands common standards of truth and objectivity. >Thoughts, >Objectivity.

- - -
Frank I 626ff
Myth of the subjective/DavidsonVsPrivate Language: according to the myth each subject looks at his private objects - Vs: Ideas only have truth conditions when they represent something, that is, when they are interpretable. >Private language.


Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111

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