Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 28
Def minimal fact/Sellars: facts about which can be reported reliably, because here errors are less likely. The fact that the tie seems to be on a certain occasion green. (SellarsVs).
With seeing, one provides more than a description of the experience. One affirms a claim.
>Evidence/Sellars.
I 44
Fact: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.)
But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing.
Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience.
>Experience.
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II 315/16
Subject: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of an utterance can be made).
>Description levels, >Level/Order, >Metalanguage, >Name of a sentence.
II 320
SellarsVsWittgenstein: we must avoid to join his equating of complex objects with facts.
>Facts/Wittgenstein, >Complex/Wittgenstein.
The claim that the complex object K, wold be the fact aRb is logical nonsense.
Fact: you can say in two different ways something "about a fact":
a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact".
b) it contains a fact expression, that means the name of a fact rather than a statement.
II 323
Natural-linguistic objects: (> Searles background):
Solution: natural-language objects are seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!).
One can speak of them as "proper names". That coincides with Wittgenstein's view that elementary statements must be constructed as proper names occurring in a particular way.
Cf. >Atomic sentences, >Atomism.