Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 18
Explanation/Field:
a) Def intrinsic explanation/Field: does not contain causally irrelevant entities (namely: mathematical entities)
b) Def extrinsic explanation/Field: also contains causally irrelevant entities.
For example, the attribution of finite sentences for the behavior of animals.

II 159
Linguistic view/Field: assumes no meanings as mind-independent entities, but assigns words of a speaker to words of an interpreter. - The relations are based on different characteristics. - I.e. to inferences that contain this word - that's what I call "meaning-characteristic". - E.g. has then the same meaning (by inference) as my actual use of "rabbit". - No intentional entities are assumed.

II 226
Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement.
Solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator"/dft-operator: this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides.

II 201
Signification/Terminology/Field: here: Relations are signed - objects are denoted. - predicates signify their extension.

II 211
Def Basis/Field: here: E.g. the basis for predicates whose extension depends on other predicates: - E.g. "rabbit", "dinosaur": depend on the basis: predicate "identical". - The functional dependency of the other predicates from the basic predicate "identical" allows the partial extensions of the predicate to be correlated with the partial extension of the others.
Def dependent: is a predicate, if it has a basis. - Now we can define relevance.
Def Relevance/Structure/Language/Gavagai/Field: a structure partially agrees with the semantics of O, iff
a) each independent term t of L denoted or signified partially m(t)
b) each dependent term t of L denoted or signified m(t) with b(t) relative to the correlation of m(b(t)). ((s) in b) not partial).
Still unsolved: how do we know which terms have a basis and which that is? - Problem: the words should also have a physical sense.

II 287
Def "weak true"/truew/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "p".
Def "strongly true"/trues/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "There is a certain fact that p".
Det-Operator/D/Field: "It is a certain fact that". - This cannot be explained with "true".

- - -
III 12
Def Principle C/Conservativity/Field: Let A be a nominalistic formulated claim.
N: a corpus of such nominalistic assertions. - S a mathematical theory.
A* is then not a consequence of N* + S if A is not itself a consequence of N* alone.
((s) "A* only if A", that is, if A * is not determined yet, that any nominalistic formulation is sufficient).

III 60
Nominalization/Field: ... this suggests that laws about T (i.e., T obeying a particular differential equation) can be reformulated as laws over the relation between f and y. That is, ultimately the predicates Scal-Cong, St-Bet, Simul, S-Cong and perhaps Scal-Less.

II 230
Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions".

I 152
Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories.
Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist.
I 153
Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term.
I 186
Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations.
Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact.
l 189
Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers.
I 192
Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. - FieldVs: instead only between objects.
III 96
1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic.
Problem: anyway he needs these (because of the power quantifiers).

II 228
Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case.
Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness.
It is not definitely true whether or not.
Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation.
Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up:
a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true
b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value.
Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness.
II 230
Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all".