I 34
Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past.
I 56
QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" ((s) Cf. Goodman, Davidson, "
fake theories").
>
Verification, >
Additional hypotheses.
I 57
For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation.
I 74
Basics for a theory: Carnap: terms - Quine: sentences.
I 393
Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because").
I 429
Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore no individuation - no identity. (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960
(1), §52.)
I 431
Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable.
I 432
Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical.
Reason: sentences are semantically primary. >
Frege principle.
1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press
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II 45
Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible.
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VI 134
Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry.
Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem.
Case 2: additional theoretical terms
Case 3: logically incompatible.
Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent.
Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible.
>
Theoretical terms.
VI 136
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power)
Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory).
Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory.
>
Elimination.
VI 139
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language.
QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question.
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XII 70
Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models.
>
Vocabulary, >
Reinterpretation, >
Abstraction, >
Models.