Glüer II 44
Def Belief/Davidson: is a sentence plus interpretation considered to be true.
Belief/Davidson/McDowell: we cannot get out of our beliefs.
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Rorty VI 36
Davidson/Rorty: most of our beliefs must be true. But not congruence subject/object, but: the pattern formed by truth is the same as the pattern formed by the justification that justifies it in our opinion.
Rorty VI 166
Brains in a Vat/Davidson/Rorty: if they have always been in the vat, they have many beliefs about their actual vat-plus-computer environment, no matter what kind of input they receive. >
Brains in a vat.
Rorty VI 187
Davidson/Rorty: Most of our beliefs must be true. Beliefs are not more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. >
Representation, >
Causal theory of knowledge.
Rorty VI 205
Davidson/Sellars: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: beliefs can only be justified by beliefs. (McDowellVs).
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Davidson I (b) 25
Belief/Davidson: is not language-dependent - DavidsonVsRussell: the objects used for identification of a belief do not need to belong to the realm of knowledge of the believer.
I 68
Belief/Deception/Error/Davidson: for identification each depends on other beliefs being in the background - the concept of chair or mouse cannot remain the same independent of its occurrence in different beliefs - you can have beliefs about guanacos from books and correctly identify them when you see one - but: despite knowing that a guanaco is not a lama, he could say "guanaco" to every lama - then, in both cases, the content is not determined by the sight of guanacos, but by the fact that you have appropriated other concepts such as "animal" "lama", "camel", "pet", etc.
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Glüer II 127
Belief/Error/Deception/Davidson: beliefs have no objects that might correspond to reality (representations), but causes - these are publicly accessible (inter-subjective) objects - ((s) the meanings that play a role in beliefs, are individuated through the public objects - (through causes)).
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Frank I 649
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong: a speaker who wants to be understood, makes sure to be interpretable - the interpreter has no other material than the sounds the speaker emits in conjunction with other events.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984),
101-111
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Frank I 680
Beliefs/Davidson: cannot all be wrong, because the use of our words (in relation to the objects) regularly gives them meaning. - >
Use theory.
Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-458
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V 107
Belief/Davidson: most must be correct: reason: the beliefs are identified by their place in the system of beliefs - there must be an endless number of true beliefs regarding this subject area - false beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter.
Thus they undermine the validity of the description of a belief as one which deals with its subject matter.
Thus false beliefs in turn undermine the assertion that a linked belief is wrong.
