Correction: (max 500 charact.)
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Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: a belief is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states.
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Brain/Brain state , >
Mental states , >
Physical/psychic , >
Propositions , >
Materialism .
These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
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Functional role .
Schiffer I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory.
Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles.
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Mapping .
Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in.
Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer:
. . .
Schiffer I 109
Def Conceptual Role/Field: (Field 1977)
(1) : the subjectively induced conditional probability function of an actor. Two mental representations s1 and s2 have the same conceptual role for one person iff. their (the person's) subjective conditional probability function is such that for each mental representation s the subjective probability of s1 given s is the same as that of s2 given s.
SchifferVs: that never happens.
Field ditto - E.g. blind persons certainly have different conceptual roles of flounders - then there will be no correlation to the belief objects either.
1. Hartry Field (1977).Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role. Journal of Philosophy 74 (7):378-409
. . .
Schiffer I 286f
Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary.
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Beliefs/Quine , >
Intentionality/Brentano .
But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.
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Propositional attitudes .