I 76
Beliefs and desires/Searle: beliefs and desires do not need to be postulated. They are simply experienced consciously and not in question.
- - -
II 31
Intentional states/Searle: we must separate the logical properties of intentional states from their ontological ones.
Tradition: intentional states are Hume's ideas, or modifications of the Cartesian ego, or causal dispositions to behaviors (SearleVs).
>
I, Ego, Self/Descartes, >
Disposition, >
Idea/Hume.
II 32
Belief/Searle: spirit on world orientation.
Intentional states/Searle: intentional states are both caused and realized in the structure of the brain.
>
Identity theory/Searle.
II 34
Intentional object: not every intentional state has an intentional object. The present King of France does not exist, so the corresponding sentence cannot be true.
II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll other authors: all beliefs are de dicto.
Of course, some beliefs are about Santa Claus and others about Napoleon, but the re-beliefs (of Napoleon) are then a subclass.
>
de dicto, >
de re.
Quine: much stronger thesis: in addition to the completely individualized de dicto beliefs through content and mode (in the head), there are also beliefs that exist between the believer and the objects. Such beliefs are then not a subclass, but rather irreducible de re.
Brains in a vat: brains in a vat could have beliefs that are purely de dicto. They are independent of the actual nature of the world.
De re-beliefs: de re-beliefs are relations between people and objects. Caution: if the world changed, the beliefs themselves would be different, even if everything in the head remained unchanged!
>
Brain in a vat.
II 262
For example, assuming George Bush believes Reagan is president of the United States. That is a fact about Bush but is it not just also a fact about Reagan? Furthermore, this fact cannot simply be explained by facts about Bush.
Quantification in "belief contexts": quantification in "belief contexts" is allowed in case of such a formulation.
Example de re: "Reagan is such that Bush believes of him that...
Cf. >
de re, >
de dicto.
