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II (b) 47
Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities. >
Regularities , >
Universals .
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Martin II 126
Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between universal-instantiations.
Armstrong: not formal, more like a >
meaning postulate . - No mysterious necessary junction between separate things.
II 127
MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection.
II 128
Question: are connections between universals themselves 2nd-stage unversals?
Martin II 128
Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particles*) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept
Martin II 129
MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things.
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II (d) 149
Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176
*
Martin: example: two non-occurring, equally likely events: no fact as truthmaker. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: there is no truth maker, no certain way, nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have reacted idiosyncratically...