Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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Frank I 148
NagelVsUnderstanding - (empathy only with mental states).
VsSolipsism: is the result of interpreting the empathic imagination as sensual.
>Empathy.
I 149f
Understanding/Nagel: we can have evidence for the truth of something that we do not understand - individuals of radically different genera (scientists from Mars) can both understand the same physical events in objective terminology.
For this they do not need to understand the phenomenal forms.(1)
>Phenomena.

1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450

- - -
Nagel I 75
Understanding/Wittgenstein: communication through language consists not only of a match in the definition, but in the judgments.
>Judgments, >Language, >Vocabulary.
Logic seems to abolish this, but it does not - congruence in language use and judgment is necessary, but not sufficient for meaning (intending).
Nagel: if the application conditions do not appear to be sufficient, it may be that one misinterpreted the concept - but also that we misunderstood the conditions.

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