Lexicon of Arguments

 

VI 2
Prediction/Forecast/Quine: it is always observations, what we predict.
>Observation/Quine.
VI 137
Terms/Theory/Quine: Exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy" have no predictive power.
IV 413
Theory: as a whole, a theory has consequences that can serve as predictions.
I 45
Theory/prediction/concepts/sentences/observation/Quine: is a mutual animation of sentences. A prediction is actually an anticipation of further evidence. If a prediction turns out to be wrong, we are dealing with a deviant and disturbing sensory stimulus that deletes the conditioning from one sentence to another that led to the prediction. So it happens that theories die when their predictions fail.
>Theories/Quine.
I 232
Truth: there are philosophers who stubbornly claim that the utterance "true" in relation to logical or mathematical laws and the utterance "true" in relation to weather forecasts or confessions are two different uses of the one ambiguous term "true".
QuineVs: what amazes me is the persistence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood as unambiguous, but very general, and the difference between true logical judgements and true confessions should not only be seen as the difference between logical laws and confessions?
>Truth/Quine.
I 335
Theoretical statements of science and mathematics are usually timeless, even reports and predictions of specific individual events are timeless if points in time, places and persons are given objectively and are not subject to the change of the reference objects of indicator words. A timeless sentence can be expected to contain no index words.
>Timelessness/Quine.