I (c) 56
Immanence Theory of Truth/Davidson: The sentence of another could be true for him, even though, when I translate it correctly, it makes no sense for me.
The truth predicate defined in the meta-language can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination can be restored of the "true". >
Truth predicate, >
Object language, >
Metalanguage.
Object language and meta-language should contain the predicate "true". >
Expressiveness, >
Richness, >
Truth theory.
Davidson, however, can avoid the dilemma by not defining a definition at all. He calls this a truth definition in the style of Tarski in the following called "truth theory".
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical instead of formal - Empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) - Convention: truth is not sufficiently empirical. >
Convention T.
The truth of an utterance depends only on two things: of what the words, as they were used, mean, and of the world.
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Glüer II 131
VsTranscendentalism: one cannot separate language competence and influence on the world. "Negative Transcendentalism".
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Rorty VI 51
Davidson/Truth: We collect information and patterns about whether actors agree to sentences or not. And this, without knowing the meaning of the sentences of actor. But after a while we do the step from the "nonpropositional to the propositional".
A theory of truth is at the same time automatically a theory of meaning and rationality. Every intensional concept is intertwined with every other intensional concept.
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Glüer II 28
Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. >
Interpretation theory.
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Horwich I 443
Truth/Davidson/Rorty: should be identified with nothing. - There is no correspondence, no truth-making. DavidsonVsPragmatism: Truth is not equal to assertion.
Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994
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Rorty VI 189
Truth/Norms/Davidson: (according to Brandom): the pursuit of truth cannot go beyond our own practices (also Sellars).
