Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Wright I 66
Definiton Truth/Peirce: that what is justified on an ideal border of recognition when all empirical information is obtained.
PutnamVsPeirce: one cannot simply know when one has all the information. Wright dito.
Cf. >Lists, >Knowledge, >Completeness.
---
Horwich I 448
Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: Peirce: For Peirce truth is the ideal final stage.
>Pragmatism, >Truth/Pragmatism.
JamesVsPeirce: neglects the mind.
"True of" is no analyzable relation - (at least not between inhomogeneous entities).
Rorty: thus James omits correspondence.
>Correspondence, >Correspondence theory, >True-of.
Dewey: completes the way: only the try to interpose "language" or "ghost", can let intentionality appear interesting.(1)
>Intentionality, >Language, >Mind.

1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

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