Lexicon of Arguments

 

Perler I 142
True/false/Searle: true and false are meta-intentional predicates. There are not only in the metalanguage.
>Meta-language, >Object-language, >Intentionality/Searle.
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III 177
Truth/Searle: all true statements about the world can be asserted without contradiction at the same time. Yes, if they cannot be asserted without contradiction at the same time, they cannot all be true. Of course, there are always problems of vagueness, indeterminacy, family similarity, open texture, contextual dependency, incommensurability of theories, ambiguity, idealization, under determination of the theory by the evidence.
>Context dependence, >Incommensurability, >Ambiguity, >Vagueness, >Idealization.
But these are characteristics of our systems of representation, not of reality independent of representation! Truth in a scheme is a property of the scheme and not a real inconsistency.
>Reality/Searle, VsSearle: >Reality/Seel, >Representation/Searle, >Underdetermination/Quine.
III 185
Truth/Reality/Searle: there is a simple but deep reason why truth and reality cannot coincide as the naive external realist must believe, according to many philosophers. Every representation a forteriori and every true representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others! They are always within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme and from a certain point of view. ((s) QuineVs, DavidsonVs). There is an infinite number of different points of view (Searle pro). Each representation has an aspect. But an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view.
III 218
Truth/Searle: truth applies to statements, truth is a term that implies evaluation, trustworthiness and quoting gives us a criterion of trustworthiness.
>Disquotation, >Truth definitions, >Truth theories.